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The Compleat Wrangler
In this article the author argues that the law is much
like mathematics and logic. Mr. R. L. Stone-de fiontpen-
sier states that the law has its own logic, and that legal
arguments are sufflciently like metaphysical arguments
to be useful tools in philosophy. He then explores the
process whereby legal concepts are derived through the
case by case method, or paraductively, and concludes
that the law appears as a calculus, containing axioms and
theorems so derived. Having explored this calculus, the
settlement of legal disputes is shown to be like the proc-
ess of settling metaphysical disputes, and the asserted
similarity of the law to logic and mathematics is thereby
demonstrated.
Roy L. Stone-de Montpensier*
For Angling may be said to be so much like the MathematiCks,
that it can ne'r be fully learnt; at least not so fully, but that there will
still be more new experiments left for the tryal of other men that
succeed us.'
This article might have been entitled other than it is. It might
have been called by that old dichotomy Nomos and Physis which,
being translated into the idiom of this thesis, might have been
rendered the nature of law and the law of nature. But such
a title would allow two sorts of philosophers to interplead and I
wish to nonsuit both philosophers of science and philosophers of
religion. The paper could have been called, with reference to
Bacon's remark to the lower house of Parliament, de vero et falso
and not de bono et malo But to deter the rejoinders of rustic
moralists and those who talk about ethics this title too was aban-
doned. I call this article "The Compleat Wrangler" because in the
book The Compleat Angler there is a discussion between the
Venator, the Piscator and the Auceps about the relative merits
and activities of hunting, fishing, and falconry. The genre of this
article is a comparison of several disciplines which carry the meta-
physical overtones of Isaac Walton's discussion. Further there is
*Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln's Ln, Cambridge, England.
1. WALToN, Tum COMPLuAT ANGLR 7 (Oxford ed. 1935).
2. 2 BACON, THE WoRns op LoRD BAcoN 278 (1850).
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that remark in The Compleat Angler which suggests that angling
is like "the Mathematicks."3 The law in this sense is also like
angling, for, in my submission, the law is in some respects like both
mathematics and logic.
PREFATORY SUMMARY
This article argues a new theory of law - the law is a calculus
having a logic of its own. Solving foundational legal problems is
like solving metaphysical problems and legal arguments are suffi-
ciently like metaphysical arguments to be considered useful tools
in philosophy.
The argument proceeds along the following lines.4 (1) Founda-
tional studies in mathematics and logic reveal the same problems
and answers encountered in foundational legal studies. (2) The
truths of mathematics and logic rest upon conclusions derived
by argument from axioms or postulates. In this respect the law
is like mathematics. (3) Arguments concerning the inexorability
of the law - why it is binding, ineluctable, irresistible and so on
- are paralleled by similar questions in mathematics and logic.
(4) Problems concerning the question what is a proof arise in all
three. The logical status of mathematics and logic share the
open-endedness seen in the legal argument over the binding force
of decisions of the House of Lords. G6del's incompleteness theorem
seems to apply equally to all. (5) The logic of the law is based
upon certain fundamental concepts contained in "judging." The
process of judging, or deciding cases, uses certain methods which
include following and not following, reconciling, and distinguish-
ing. These methods can be compared to negation, disjunction,
classification and individuation in logical systems. Further the
law is concerned with de vero et falso and not de bono et malo.
(6) The status of legal statements, propositions, and concepts are
contained within the logic of the law. (7) A comparative study of
meta-languages setting up mathematical, logical, and legal systems
reveals that each uses the logic and language of ordinary speech.
(8) The consistency of the law can be established by establishing
the consistency of a part of a legal system. This too has an
analogy in mathematics, as in mathematical induction. (9) Cases
and rules of law derived from cases and lines of cases are analogous
to isomorphism in formalized systems and to the use of analogies
3. WALTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7.
4. Compare Stone, Affinitks and Antinomies in Jurfsuee, 1964 C A.
L.J. 266, 281.
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and models in science. The differences that exist are revealing.
(10) Legal concepts are derived from cases by paraduction, the
case-by-case method, or similibum pjrocedere ad similia.5 (11) Cases
can be similar without sharing a common factor and without being
equivalent. Legal concepts are pre-eminently constituted by family
resemblances. (19) The body of the law presents the appearance
of a calculus containing axioms and theorems derived paraduc-
tively. Therefore, the resolution of legal disputes resembles the
settlement of metaphysical disputes.
PART I
Law is like logic and mathematics because, in a developed sys-
tem of law, theorems are derived from axioms not only by deduc-
tion but by that method of argument (well known to common
law systems and, indeed, known to the civil law of Rome) which
has been characterized for metaphysical arguments by Professor
Wisdom as the case-by-case procedureP This method I call para-
duction. The law also uses deduction to make transformations in
its calculus, but deduction is used less often than is paraduction.
The paraductive argument is more interesting because where the
law uses deduction it shows us nothing more interesting than
what can be seen of syllogism and logic in Euclid. It is unlikely
to be questioned that the legal calculus resembles a calculus in
mathematics and logic where theorems of law are deductively
derived from axioms of law. But a legal calculus is no less a cal-
culus where theorems are paraductively derived from axioms.
The axioms of the law are sometimes derived from the cases
themselves. This is perhaps a curious feature of a legal logic.
Sometimes, however, the axioms are lost in the urns and sepul-
chres of mortality, having been produced or enunciated at a time
"whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." That
is, not merely beyond legal memory but beyond all memory. Such
axioms are conceivable and logically possible. Two examples will
suffice. Such are two maxims, "No one is the heir of a living
person" (Nemo est haeres vivents)7 and "Under the title of heirs,
comes heirs ad infinitum" (Haeredum appellatione veniunt
haeredes haredum in infinitum).' As an historical matter we do not
5. 1 BRAcToN, DE LEGiBUS ET CoNsUFTUDnimBus ANGLIAB 8 (Twiss ed.
1878).
6. WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICS, AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 157-58,
250-52 (1953).
7. Co. Lrin. 29b.
8. Co. LiTT. 9.
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know the origin of these maxims. But as logical matters we can
appreciate their place in a legal calculus. Our inability to assign
authorship or origin to them strengthens their purely conceptual
condition and logical nature.
A very simplified account of the law around the year 1230
provides an example of the operation of a theorem derived from
axioms. It became fashionable in those times to limit gifts of land
to a living being, (let us call him A) and his "heirs," or to A and
the "heirs of his body," or to A and his "issue," or to A and his
"children." The judges who had to construe these gifts were faced
with several possible interpretations. The gift to A and his issue,
A being alive and having children, might be construed: (1) To
give A the interest during his life and upon his death to pass to
those issue who were living at the date of the gift; (2) to A for
life and then to his issue who were living at the date of A's death;
(3) equally between A and the issue who are living at the date of
the gift, either (a) in common in equal shares absolutely, or (b)
jointly with survivorship between the joint tenants. From the
13th to the 20th century many cases construed limitations to A
and his issue and to A and his children freely, giving effect to the
intentions of the grantor upon the words contained in the gift.
However, the limitation to A and his heirs, was not construed
freely or unrestrictedly. Rather, there was a limited application
of the principles of construction. Heirs could only be determined
upon the death of A. During the lifetime of the ancestor, poten-
tial heirs were called either "apparent" or "presumptive." Strictly
construed, the limitation to A and his heirs did not give the
heirs ,anything by way of purchase, for heirs were determinable
only upon the happening of a future event - the death of the
ancestor. No one immediately came within the class. The fact
that in contemplation of law a man could have heirs ad inflnitum
was also used to limit or bound the interpretation so that
the quantity of the estate which A took was to perdure. The
result of this construction was that A took the gift to himself
and heirs absolutely in fee simple. The words "and his heirs"
were called words of limitation because they determined or
limited the nature and quantum of A's estate. The importance of
this process can be best seen by viewing it as an instance of the
derivation of a theorem from two axioms. After many consistent
applications from the middle of the 14th century to the latter part
of the 16th century, the theorem became one of the most famous
rules of law.
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PART II. THE ROLE OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
About the year 1900, gifts "limited to the donee 'and the heirs
of his body"' or gifts to "a husband and his wife 'and the heirs of
their bodies'" emerged with some frequency.9 These limitations
ultimately gave rise to the rule in Shelley's Case,0 but not by
direct descent from precedent to precedent. The doctrine of strict
precedent was not then in the King's court and the Statute De
Donis"' tolled its entry by preventing any direct line traceable
at common law. The courts construed gifts to A and the heirs of
his body and gifts to A and his heirs if he shall have an heir of his
body as if they were the same limitation. But Bracton conceived
it was false doctrine that the issue are enfeoffed along with their
ancestor and held that the ancestor took an estate absolutely if
he should have an heir.S Here we have a conditional fee at com-
mon law. "Whether he [Bracton] would have taken the further
step of holding that A, so soon as he has a child, can make an
alienation which, even when his issue have failed, will defeat the
claim of the donor- that is, to say the least, very doubtful.""
But this step was taken in the reign of Edward I. By the time of
De Donis, a conditional gift had become known as a fee tail.
About the same time, the term fee simple was used to describe
the estate a man holds under the grant to him and his heirs.
In the early 14th century there was no settled construction
of the limitations to A and his heirs or to A and the heirs of
his body. The rule in Shelley's Case4 was a rule of law which, as
subsequently explained,15 provided a construction:
[W]herever an estate for life is given to the ancestor and propositus,
and a subsequent gift is made to take effect after his death, in such
terms as to embrace, according to the ordinary principles of construc-
tion, the whole series of his heirs, or heirs of his body, or heirs male of
9. See 2 PoLLocK & AMA.,mAx, Tnm HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 16 (2d ed.
1923).
10. For example, in 1252 Henry III gave land to his brother Richard, to
hold to him and his heirs begotten of his wife Sanchia, with an express clause
stating that the land was to revert on the failure of such heirs to the King and
his heirs. Placit. Abbrev. 145.
11. Second Statute of Westminster, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1.
12. 1 BRAcTON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 135-41.
13. 2 PoL~ocK & MArAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 19.
14. Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. Rep. 93, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (C.B. 1581). Accord-
ing to Lord Watson in Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A.C. 658, 667, the rule
was finally established by the House of Lords in 1890 in the case of Jesson v.
Wright, 2 Bli. 1, 4 Eng. Rep. 230 (1820).
15. See Roddy v. Fitzgerald, 6 H.L.C. 821, 10 Eng. Rep. 1518 (1858).
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his body, or whole inheritable issue taking in a course of succession,
the law requires that the heirs, or heirs male of the body, or issue shall
take by descent, and will not permit them to take by purchase, not-
withstanding any expression of intention to the contrary.' 6
Holdsworth cited the year book in 135117 and again in 13651s
where the rule was clearly laid down. The rule was also relied
on in 1367. ' Holdsworth gave two reasons for the emergence of
the rule:20 Judicial feeling from the earliest time favoring free
alienation; and a desire to preserve the incidents of feudal tenure.
The pattern produced by these two reasons runs through the
dicta of judges from Bracton to Lord Nottingham in the Duke
of Norfolk's Case.F' The common law also formulated a rule
against the abeyance of seisin. This resulted partly from the feel-
ing expressed by Judge Anthony Brown that there must always
be someone seized of the fee to answer actions.F
The law at this time decided that contingent remainders to
the heirs of an unborn person were not valid. Thus, in a limitation
to A, remainder to B and the heirs of his body, remainder to the
heirs of A, it was impertinent to ask the effect of this limitation
if B died during A's life without leaving an heir of his body. A had
to take the fee, for A may not have had heirs living at the time of
the gift or at B's death. Since contingent remainders to unborn
issue were not then recognized, the gift could not be construed
as a life estate to A with the conditional limitation over. By 1568,
Brett v. Rigdet 3 clearly stated the rule and demonstrated its
application both to deeds and to wills.
The historical account of the development of the rule in Shel-
ley's Case illustrates how complicated and numerous are the
axioms and theorems of the law. This account is simplified merely
to show that the rule depended upon decisions concerning: (1) The
primitive axioms; (2) rules concerning contingent remainders; (3)
future limitations; (4) class gifts; (5) the rules surrounding seisin.
The history of the rule shows it to be a product of reflection
16. Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A.C. 658, 684-85 (opinion of Lord
Davey).
17. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 107 n.7 (sd ed. 1923).
18. Id. at 107 n.8.
19. Id. at 107 n.9.
20. Id. at 106.
21. Howard v. Norfolk, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
22. Willion v. Berkeley, 1 Plowd. 223, 229, 75 Eng. Rep. 339, 349 (K.B.
1561).
23. 1 Plowd. 340, 75 Eng. Rep. 516 (K.B. 1568).
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upon other cases in which axioms and theorems were used. This
history is separate from Pollock and Maitland's historic account,
for it is concerned with the logical derivation of the rule.
The history of the rule illustrates that the law shows better
than mathematics or logic, how we deal with rules, and how we
establish, make, or discover them. Generally rules depend upon
and do not precede the cases. Conversely cases do not depend
upon, but precede the rules. I hope to show that this argument is
a necessity. But first I want to show pragmatically how the law
deals with this rule making, rule discovering, rule establishing, and
rule applying technique. Here legal history is a useful source for
it may indicate what is lost in the history of logic and mathe-
matics. To discover that logic and mathematics were built up
either empirically, pragmatically, or inductively may free us from
the mental bondage of the necessary and the a priori. This may
remove the idea that the general must precede the particular in
mathematics- not as a logical conceptual matter but as a pro-
cedural, pragmatic, concern. This may in turn enable us to see
the logic of cases better. Part of my thesis is that the cases, even if
they reflect unnecessary matters of fact, are nevertheless con-
cerned with logical possibility and concepts.
Between 1350 and Shelley's Case, about eight vastly different
yet analogous cases were decided. Some had limitations in deeds
and in wills which themselves contained prior gifts to heirs of
the donees of those prior gifts or to the heirs of the body. The
judges in 1581 declared that the reasons behind the consistent
construction of gifts to A and his heirs were such that they could
now make a general rule, the rule in Shelley's Case. This is an
example of the judicial technique of producing a general rule of
law. After the rule in Shelley's Case had become a rule of law, it
was applied in subsequent cases as a premise in a deduc-
tion. Sometimes it was attacked-just as philosophers
might attack the rules of inference, or doubt the law of the
excluded middle, or the modus ponens. Sometimes the rule was
criticized. Sometimes it was alleged that those cases which sup-
ported the rule did not warrant it. Generally the rule is "applied,"
"explained," or "criticized," or it is "extended," "restricted," or
"limited." These are the functions which are used in dealing with
a rule once it is generalized as a rule.
Let us reiterate how the judges decided Shelley's Case. They
examined previous cases and saw the reasons for those cases, their
likenesses and dissimilarities, and the family resemblances run-
WRANGLER 10071966]
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ning through them. They compared the theorems derived from
the axioms. The condition and results of their analysis were such
that they declared a general statement of the rule that for all
such cases rule R could be made. Additionally the judges saw
more generally and in a more ramified and recondite way that
they could make rules Ri... R., from which cases I to N could
be decided.
The law is a calculus - -a complex of theorems and axioms. It is
not a calculus consisting only of commands, or only of rights,
duties and privileges, or only of rules. The calculus theory is an
explicit denial and an implicit refutation of the view that the law
consists solely of commands.F4 Something must be said about the
general nature of the theorems of the law. They may be counter-
factuals, or like counterfactuals. Perhaps they are conditional
hypotheticals, some sort of "counterceptuals." By this suggestion
is meant that the law - the cases, lines of cases, rules, statutes,
etc. - operates conditionally. If rule a and rule o apply, and rule
phi and psi do not, then X. X is a conclusion or a theorem. A case
in point is the application of two theorems; one contained in the
rule in Sibley 'v. Perry,25 and the other a simple rule of construc-
tion applied to the word "issue" when used in a limitation. Issue
simpliciter means issue and remoter issue of the persona designata
to all degrees. The rule in Sibley says where the word issue is
used with reference to parent, then only the children of that
parent are included in the description issue. A judge must consider
these two mutally exclusive theorems in order to construe a gift to
issue. If the rule in Sibley applies, then the general rule of con-
struction does not.
Calling this activity the application of counterfactuals may be
misleading. That the theorems work as conditionals seems to me
to be undeniable. The urge to call them contrary to fact con-
ditions reflects Wisdom's suggestion that legal questions are
reflective, nonnecessary questions of fact.2 6 To call them condi-
tional hypotheticals reflects an unsettled element in legal entities.
To call them counterceptuals, or contrary to concept conditions,
24. See DAUBE, FORMS OF ROmAN LEGISLATION 4-5 (1956), where it is
stated that, "the following nine expressions are used: oportet, neceanum est,
mos est, fas est, ium est, religio est, piaculum eat, lictum east, constitutum est-
but never a 'they shall' or 'shall not'."
25. 7 Ves. 528, 32 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ch. 1802).
26. See Wisdom, Philosophy, Metaphksic, and Psycho-analysis in Fm-
LOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-AXALYSIS 248 (1958).
1008
1966] WRANGLER 1009
may bring out the correspondence between legal entities and
mathematical entities.
I shall make an analysis of the judicial process into the settling
questions relating to Alpha facts, Aleph facts, and legal concepts. 7
27. The difficulty in deciding what is a question of law and what is a
question of fact when dichotomized in the traditional form, is brought out by
Lord Mansfield in Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 744, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B.
1778):
[w]ith great respect to Lord Chief Justice Lee's memory, I think the
jury asked him a very proper question; whether this drawing and re-
drawing was, in point of law, a trading in merchandize within the
statutes concerning bankrupts? And as the note is taken, he might
have directed them as it is there said he did. But 'the report says, he
told them it was a question of fact, and not of law. With all deference
to his opinion, it was a question of law upon the fact. It may be proper
to leave it to the jury, whether the person gets a profit or remits other
people's money; but the fact being established, the result is a matter
of law.
Id. at 751-52, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1343.
The trichotomy Alpha Facts, Aleph facts and law takes care of this situa-
tion. Alpha facts are the facts suggested by Mansfield. Aleph facts are his
question of law upon the fact, that it is the pastiche and melange I described,
and -the pure question of law.
Further, in Tindal v. Brown, 1 Term. 167, 168, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1034
(K.B. 1786):
What is reasonable notice is partly a question of fact, and partly a ques-
tion of law. It may depend in some measure on facts; such as the dis-
tance at which the parties live from each other, the course of the post,
etc. But wherever a rule can be laid down with respect to this reason-
ableness, that should be decided by the Court, and adhered to by every
one for the sake of certainty.
In Medcalf v. Hall, 3 Doug. 118, 115, 99 Eng. Rep. 556, 567 (K.B. 1782)
(opinion of Mansfield, L.C.J.).
Nothing is more mischievous than uncertainty in mercantile law.
It would be terrible if every question were to make a cause, and to be
decided according to the temper of the jury. If a rule is intended to
apply to and govern a number of like cases, that rule is a rule of law. If
the rule 'be that the bill must be presented in a reasonable time, judging
from the circumstances of the particular case, then the verdict of thejury is correct; but I doubt extremely whether that rule can be main-
tained, on account of the great inconvenience which it would occasion
in the circulation of paper.
In Tindal v. Brown, supra at 169, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1035, Justice Buller fairly
stated my view:
The numerous cases on this subject reflect great discredit on the
Courts of Westminster. They do infinite mischief to the mercantile
world; and the evil can only be remedied by doing what the Court
wished to do in the case of Medcaif and Hall; by considering the rea-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1001
It will be shown that theorems are constituted from either legal
concepts or Aleph facts, and that Alpha facts are merely the
occasion for deriving new theorems or writing new axioms into
the calculus. The first example of the theorem that a gift to
A and his heirs constitutes a fee simple is an example of a pure
question of law. The case of Woolridge v. Sumner," particularly
the judgment of Lord Justice Diplock, is an example of a theorem
consisting of Aleph facts. As the calculus consists of both law and
Aleph facts - in other words, the axioms and theorems are de-
rived both from rules of law, rules of construction, and from cases
-it is difficult to categorize the status of the axioms and
theorems of the legal calculus in accordance with current philo-
sophical vocabulary and concepts. The legal calculus preserves
something of a mathematical and logical nature; for insofar as it
does not relate to reality it is certain, and insofar as it relates to
reality it is uncertain.
Not all matters left to the jury are Alpha facts. Where all the
evidence is in, all the witnesses have been heard, all the observa-
tions have been made, and yet there is still doubt, a jury ques-
tion remains. These are Aleph facts. Did the defendant in a
case of tort exercise reasonable care? Lord Justice Diplock has
reminded us that such a question is one of fact and not of law:
To treat Lord Atkin's statement "You must take reasonable care to
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably forsee would be likely
to injure your neighbour," as a complete exposition of the law of negli-
gence is to mistake aphorism for exegesis. It does not purport to de-
fle what is reasonable care and was directed to identifying the persons
to whom the duty -to take reasonable care is owed. What is reasonable
care in a particular circumstance is a jury question and where, as in a
case like this, there is no direct guidance or hindrance from authority
it may be answered by inquiring whether -the ordinary reasonable man
would say that in all the circumstances the defendant's conduct was
blameworthy."'2 9
How then do judges decide cases? There are well-known judi-
cial techniques. There is "following" and "not following" a case.
This point has direct relevance to mathematics and logic. In
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein asked
sonableness of time as a question of law and not of fact. Whether the
post goes out -this or that day, and at what time, etc. are matters of
fact: but when those facts are established, it then becomes a question
of law on those facts, what notice shall be reasonable.
28. [1963] 2 Q.B. 43, 60 (opinion of Diplock, L.J.).
29. Id. at 66-67.
1010
WRANGLER
what it was to follow or not to follow a rule or proofV° There are
two techniques which are fundamental to legal ratiocination or
paraduction and which are related to two fundamental matters in
logic and epistemology. These techniques are "distinguishing" and
"reconciling." We distinguish or reconcile cases, lines of cases, and
rules or maxims. "Distinguishing" is like "individuation" and
"reconciliation" is like "classification." Individuation and classi-
fication seem to me to be fundamental and irreducible mental
faculties. They are the epistemological correspondences of legal
distinguishing and reconciling; and logical "negation" and "dis-
junction." The correspondence between these techniques reflects
the connection between epistemic and alethic modes and seems to
me an argument in favor of the view that the truth functions of
law, like those of logic, are alethic and not deontic.
The whole of logic can be reduced, so Whitehead and Russell
tell us in Principia Mathematica,31 into two functions, negation
and disjunction. Negation is like distinguishing and disjunction is
like reconciling 3 2 These connections with logic and mathematics
enjoin us to consider other similarities in the use of cases. We
must now consider what is said to be the great barrier between
the logician and the metaphysician. One loves rules and the
general and the other prefers cases and the multifariousness and
richness of comparing instance with instance; one prefers beauty
and truth and simplicity to life, and the other sees truth and
beauty and simplicity in life. Wang said that formalization in
mathematics and logic is no more than a comparison of the sys-
temized, tightened application of intuitive analogies 3 Further,
"formalization and abstraction serve as tools of thinking and re-
search."3 4 Formalization also provides speed, economy of thought,
and help in avoiding "messy results."35 But we can do without
S0. WITTGENSTEIN, II ARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEM ATICS 2-5
(1956). See also WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE BooK 12-13 (1960); WITTGEFSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHIcAL vESTIGATIONS § 206-40 (1963).
31. See 1 WHITEHAD & RussELL, PRINciPIr MATHEmATICA 46-47 (2d ed.
1925).
32. Reconciling can be thought of as conjunction as well as disjunction. A
lawyer may be happier with conjunction although the construction of a gift
by will to A or B is sometimes construed conjunctively and sometimes dis-junctively. In this usage, therefore, they seem to be antinomies whereas in
logic conjunction is the mirror image of disjunction. One could say that they
are completely dual.
33. See Wang, On Fornalization, 64 MIND 226 (1955).
34. Id. at 231.
35. Id. at 238.
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formalization. This point ought to be stressed because there is a
tendency to think that those who use the paraductive method
are not doing anything which relates to logic. There is a counter
point. When driven by the exasperating attacks of the logician to
consider the inventive systems they build, those who indulge in
informal concepts and arguments might reply that formalization
can tell us nothing we did not know already. Formalization can
do what a study of cases does for a law student and what the
product of rules like the rule in Shelley's Case does for a lawyer
- that is, it makes analogies more perspicuous, easier to see,
easier to grasp, and more accessible. It does not affect the logical
status of the isomorphic and make it more logical, precise, valua-
ble, or valid than the informal analogies. Wang told us that
analogy and intuition, great aids in argument, are used when we
consider that the formal matters which obtain in the cases of
accessible numbers also obtain in the domain of the inaccessible
numbers 8 The activities of approving, disapproving, doubting,
criticizing, explaining, discussing, reversing, overruling, affirming,
commenting on, preferring, and so on, have a well known place in
the legal calculus. In The Aello,37 Lord Radcliffe discussed the con-
cepts of "port area" and "an arrived ship." He explicitly stated
that he preferred a particular line of authorities discussed by Lord
Justice Kennedy in Leonis Steamship Co. v. Rank Ltd.,'8 to that
line of authorities discussed by Lord Justice Buckley in the same
case. Lord Radcliffe felt the account of Kennedy contained not
merely a deeper and longer analysis of the cases, but was free
from "internal inconsistencies."39 He further pointed out that the
analogy cited by Buckley was not commensurate with the facts,
and that he was stretching the analogies too far.40 It is interesting
that Lord Radcliffe should have discussed "conception of com-
mercial area," "internal inconsistencies," and "analogy," 41 be-
cause part of my thesis that the law is calculus is that consistency
36. See WANG, Eighty Years of Foundational Studies, in A SURvEY oF
MATHEmATICAL LOGIC 34, 40 (1961).
37. [1961] A.C. 135 (1960). In The Aello the question was whether the
Aello was or was not an arrived ship until October 29, for when she was
anchored in the roads she was not within the commercial area of the port,
namely, that part of the port where a ship could be loaded when a berth was
available. See id. at 165-68.
38. [1908] 1 K.B. 499.
39. [1961] A.C. at 166.
40. Id. at 168-69.
41. Id. at 168.
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is written into the system. So too Lord Mansfield used "fallacy" in
relation to analogy.4
2
I want to show in the end that mathematicians, logicians, and
scientists rest their laws upon comparisons of the likenesses and
dissimilarities of particular cases. Gauss used this means to prove
that imaginary numbers were numbers 8 He put the natural
number series in a Cartesian coordinate upon the horizontal axis
42. See Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 457-59, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401-02
(K.B. 1758):
But the whole fallacy of the argument turns upon comparing bank notes
to what they do not resemble, and what they ought not to be compared
to, viz. to goods, or to securities, or document for debts.
Now they are not goods, nor securities, nor documents for debts, nor
are so esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary
course and transaction of business, by the general consent of man-kind ....
A bank-note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad,
treated as money, as cash; and paid and received, as cash; and it is
necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their currency should be
established and secured.
A typical misconception in a lawyer's writing is that of Mansfield's biogra-
pher who in the face of Mansfield's own use of analogy and the judicial process
persists in talk of deduction as the aim of law and induction as the method
of Mansfield:
Co-ordination, however, has its peculiar perils. While the jurist is
transforming a series of unrelated observations into a complex abstrac-
tion, the raw material upon which it is based tends to become ever more
remote. The end is forgotten in the means, and the process of general-
ization, designed to produce a principle for the guidance of future con-
duct, is pursued, without ulterior motive, as an intellectual exercise.
Lord Mansfield's mind was of too practical a cast to cherish this illu-
sion. Even while he made his inductions he retained a vivid impression
of the facts of litigation, and remembered that his function was not
to foster scholastic controversy, but to satisfy merchantile interest.
FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 93 (1936).
The law is exactly the same and fully settled upon the analogy of -promis-
sory notes to bills of exchange, which is very clear when the point of resem-
blance is once fixed. While the promissory note continues in its original shape
of a promise from one man to pay to another it bears similitude to a bill
of exchange; when it is endorsed the resemblance begins, for then it is an order
by the endorser upon the maker of the note to pay the endorsee. This is the
very definition of a bill of exchange. This line of reasoning from analogy
Fifoot calls, and wrongly so, Mansfield's "inductions." Ibid. Compare Fifoot's
"facts of litigation," with Milsom's "The logic of a trial, and the logic of a
battle," in Milsom, LEGAL INTRODUCTION TO NovAE NARnATIONEs (80 Selden
Society 1963). It is significant that Milsom can use a somewhat technical term
"fallacy" in connection with analogy.
48. WAISAIrANN, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEmiATICAL THINKiNG 10 (1951).
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and the imaginary number series upon the vertical axis. By rotat-
ing ninety degrees, he moved the imaginary number series into
the series of natural numbers. This immediately brought to his
notice so many likenesses with natural numbers that the hitherto
fantastic and disputed numerical entities were henceforth properly
thought to fall within the concept of number. The same sort
of procedure was used with infinite numbers. No formal proof
was used nor were deductions made from definitions: merely com-
paring and contrasting known but unseen features revealed the
number-like nature of infinite numbers. Strawson states categori-
cally that in logic the rules of inference (if A is bigger than B,
and B is bigger than C, then A is bigger than C) are based upon
what he calls "formal analogies." His discussion, but for the word
"formal," corresponds with the procedure which lawyers at com-
mon law have used for centuries, and which some metaphysicians
now show to be at the bottom and at the end of all arguments.
Einstein, in the second lecture on the meaning of relativity, inter-
estingly used the possibly metaphorical "a glance at" when he
said: "A glance at equations (23) and (24) shows that the Lorentz
transformation so defined is identical with the translational and
rotational transformations of the Euclidean geometry, if we dis-
regard the number of dimensions and relations of reality. '45 This
seems to be no more -a logical activity than does distinguish-
ing and reconciling. The further activities which the law has
developed are sophisticated maneuvers which refine the basic and
fundamental activities of distinguishing and reconciling.
We must now turn to consistency and the law. How did the
law achieve consistency? Here again there are parallels with logic
and mathematics. What is the logical status of the rule laid
down in London T'amways Co. v. London County Council that
the decisions of the House of Lords are binding upon itself? Some
critics say that the decision heaved itself up by its own boot-
straps and that its arguments were circular. Even if this is true,
my argument that the law is logical still holds. As Wittgenstein,
Ramsey, and Russell have done, we can say that logic is a tau-
tology. I cite Ramsey's famous aphorism47 that "logic issues in
tautologies, mathematics in identities, philosophy in definitions."
I do not, however, wish to rely on this argument. The London
44. STRAwsoN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL THEORY 45 (1952).
45. Eimsmn_, THE MEANING OF R ATrVITY 35 (1923).
46. [1898] A.C. 375.
47. RxmsEy, FoUNDATIoNs OF M THaATICS 264 (1931).
1014
Tramways Co. decision carries with it a principle of consistency.
Whether the consistency principle is derived from the law itself,
or from some rule of interpretation put into the law by the meta-
language setting up the law, shall not be discussed here. Which-
ever way, it is my submission that the law is consistent and the
law must be consistent, just as, and in the same way as, and for
the same reasons as, mathematics and logic must be consistent;
much in the same way as metaphysics must be consistent if meta-
physics is based upon rational argument. This follows since the
product of rational argument must always be consistent.
Consider the situation if the House of Lords established a rule
that "the decisions of this House are not binding upon the
House." This would involve a paradox similar to that produced
by the Cretan liar who said 'I always tell lies." The discussion of
Whitehead and Russell48 is also relevant to the House of Lords'
rule in this matter. It seems to me also that G6del's results would
also apply, for the rule, even though concerned with consistency,
is not provable within the legal system. If it were provable, it
would be refutable; since the rule is not internally provable, it is
irrefutable. To ask for the logical status of the rule in London
Tramways Co. does not place me in an embarrassing position any
more than does G6del's theorem place logicians and mathema-
ticians in such a position. Similarly, it is arguable that once the
question of papal infallibility arose in the 19th century, it had to be
answered in favor of infallibility if the decision was to be rational,
consistent, and logical. It is perfectly true that people can act
inconsistently and say and do contradictory things. But once they
animadvert and decide rationally what they are doing, they must
decide in favor of a consistency principle. This is another "point
de rattachement" between law, logic, and mathematics, and yet
another correspondence pointing to the calculus-like feature of
the law.
How can we prove that their decision in London Tramways Co.
is binding upon the House of Lords? I would not cite an authority
for the proposition to be proved. I would do what is done in mathe-
matical induction to prove the consistency of mathematics by
reference to the consistency of a part of mathematics, as is sug-
gested by Waismann.4 9 I would ask the would-be objector a gen-
48. 1 WEITEHEAD & RussmLr, op. cit. supra note 31, at 60.
49. See WAsmANN, op. cit. supra note 43, at 100. The question of proof
and its validity or justification arises in the law as well as in mathematics,
logic and the natural sciences. Bacon in his arguments at law uses the expres-
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eral question of law which I happen to know was decided in the
House of Lords. I would ask him: "Do you know that the legal
concept of charity, or charitable purposes is, for the relief of
poverty, the advancement of religion, the advancement of educa-
tion and for other purposes beneficial to the community?" If
honest and not perverse he would have to answer affirmatively.
"Where was that laid down?"
"In Pemsel's Case5" per Lord MacNaughton in the House of
Lords."
"And do you know that moneys paid under a mistake of law
are not recoverable?"
"Yes," he would have to affirm, "it was laid down in Sinclair v.
Brougham."'51
"And do you know that a gift for charitable or benevolent
purposes is void if not charitable?"
sion "I shall prove plain" and in the same sense "I will show." Proof is said to
be strict, formal, rigorous, rigid and valid. In logicomathematical systems there
is - relativity of proof which is generally characterized along a manifold
bounded at either end -by informal and formal. The more ramified and formal-
ized the logic and the less intuitive the concepts employed in it the greater the
formal validity is attributed to the proof. In law likewise there is a relativity
of proof. The facts must be proved by evidence. The case must be proved in
criminal causes beyond all reasonable doubt, and in civil actions upon the
balance of probability. A legal point is established by paraduction, sometimes
by deduction. The most formal proofs seem to arise in law over proof of title
to realty., 1 PRESToN, ABSTRACTS 9 (2d ed. 1823) gives formal abstracts and
uses the expression "deducing title." Likewise, WrnERs, EvmlsIoNs 5-6 (2d
ed. 1933), writes:
But, in advising on title to equitable interests in personalty, the con-
veyancer cannot confine his attention to matters appearing in the
Abstract and wants to be satisfied that the beneficial interest in ques-
tion is not subject to any such equity, i.e. to obtain conveyancing evi-
dence, if not legal proof of a negative.
Generally speaking, the most important negatives to be established
are ....
BuLEN & LskxE, PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING 691 (2d ed. 1863), discusses how
a case should be proved in pleadings both as to the facts to be alleged and
established, what inferences can be made and what evidence is required, and
as to law what arguments and cases are necessary. Keating and Willes suggest
that "pleadings must be perspicuous." Smrr, LEADING CASES 103 (4th ed.
Keating & Willes 18-). This reminds us of Russell's requirement of proof in
WHi EHUAD & RussE, op. cit. supra note 31, and Wittgenstein's comment
upon it in WITTGENSTEIN, RImAnRsen UPON THE FOUxDATiONS OF MATHEMATICS
(1956). My point is that proof need not be formal, strict, rigorous, rigid, and
so on to be convincing or to be a proof.
50. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel,
[1891] A.C. 531, 583.
51. [1914] A.C. 398.
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We would have to say, "Yes, for it was laid down in Grimond v.
Grimnd.'52
"And so what would happen if you distributed a fund to hospi-
tals under a gift for charitable or benevolent purposes? Could the
money be recovered?"
"Yes," he would admit, "it was decided in the case Re Diplock's
Estate."53
The Diplock Case was a theorem derived from the three axioms
laid down in Pensel's Case, Sinclair, and Grimond. It was inexora-
ble, ineluctable, and necessary that Diplock's Case be decided as it
was. The theorem was derived from the cluster of three cases in
accordance with legal arguments. These decisions of the House of
Lords are theorems, and the law being what it is, they could not
be otherwise. They are paraductive and consistent. There are
other clusters of cases, hundreds of cases, forming part of the
legal calculus which are consistent in themselves and demonstrate
the consistency of the rest of the calculus. These clusters of cases
prove such propositions as: (1) The rule in Shelley's Case is a
rule of law; (2) Money, when used in a will, may include real prop-
erty. (n) ....
That the objector would accept these propositions as a rules of
law because they are decisions of the House of Lords would argue
in favor of his accepting the proposition "the decisions of the
House of Lords, are binding on itself," because the decision is
within the series 1- n. This decision is one of a series of deci-
sions of the House of Lords. Once we know the nature of the series,
as Wittgenstein notes, we know how to go on. It is not so much
what the House of Lords said which is under discussion, but that
it has said it.
The axiomatic treatments may cause some concern that the
calculus like nature of the law may suggest that certain features
which are relevant to the nonnecessary reflective nature of law
are obfuscated or obscured. I do not think these features have
been completely destroyed. Remembering that the foundational
problems in mathematics and logic, and the arguments supporting
each resemble the foundational problems of law, and that the
arguments supporting each and all of them resemble one another,
and that these problems are themselves part of epistemology and
part of metaphysics, should keep the metaphysical or overtly
philosophical nature of legal concepts, and the concepts of law,
before us. Finitism, conventionalism, intuitionism, Platonism,
52. [1905] A.C. 121.
53. [1948] All E.R. 429 (C.A.).
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Pythagoreanism, transfinite realism, and so on have their counter-
parts in the command theory, the normative theory, American real-
ism, Scandinavian realism, the rule theory, and natural law theories
of law. Another feature lending support to this confidence is the re-
flection ,that some mathematicians and logicians thought a satis-
factory set theory would solve, dissolve, or resolve, foundational
problems in mathematics and logic. As Wang has pointed out, this
was but a vain hope, and eighty years of foundational studies have
left the problems unsolved though not quite where they were. 4
The next argument relating to rules proceeding from cases
brings the calculus of the law into line with the metaphysical
nature of certain legal questions and the ultimate metaphysical
nature of the concept of law itself. Suppose there was a rule that
all rules precede cases. How could we prove that rule to be true?
We would proceed, in my submission, as follows: Rule 1 estab-
lishes that all rules precede cases. Rule 2 states that rule Ri pre-
cedes cases 1 . .. n. Rule n shows that Rule Rn precedes cases
In ... nn. Again, Rule A says that it precedes cases 1 ... n. Rule
Alpha .... Rule Aleph . . . taw, and so on. Now this in itself
shows cases of rules preceding the general rule that all rules pre-
cede the cases. In my submission, this is a proof that the cases
precede the rules. This submission is borne out by a study of
every rule of law or rule of construction within the law. Although
it is a pragmatic matter, every rule which is known as the rule in
a case, is maintained by, supported by, derived from prior cases.
These cases too, have been argued case-by-case, paraductively.
This fact puts the original statement about the status of the
axioms - such as a person can have an heir till the end of time,
which I suggested was a logical possibility - in a curious position.
Even this axiom falls within the last proof that the cases support
the axioms of the law. I do not think that it is objectionable that
axioms are proved by the cases. It is not objectionable because
axioms could and can be given as postulates, and may be sub-
sequently verified or falsified.
In this formal proof that the rules depend upon the cases, it
may seem that we have run serially through cases, or rules pre-
ceding cases. It may thus be objected that this is an empirical
matter and can not prove a logical point any more than running
through all even numbers to see that they divide into the sum
of two primes can prove the theorem that all even numbers are
the sum of two primes. How we prove the theory that all even
54. See Wang, supra note 33, at 54-57.
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numbers are the sum of two primes, how we prove that rules pre-
cede cases, how we establish the modus ponens involves the ques-
tion of how we prove that anything is a proof. The question "Is
this a proof?" reminds us of the questions "Is this a number?"
'Is this a law?" "Is this a dog?" These are metaphysical problems,
and are answered in the case of proof by considering actual and
possible cases of proof. We do this by using the family resem-
blances, argument, and paraduction.
Thus, following Wittgenstein's advice, 5 we run through differ-
ent sorts of proof to see the family resemblances in mathematical,
logical, scientific, factual, legal, and historical proofs. We see that
paraductive argument is a proof - a proof as convincing as any
proof can be. The paraductive argument serves, as we have seen,
as a proof for Gauss, Einstein, Strawson, and the courts of law.
We find it when Proust proves that there is no such thing as
love, when Polya56 examines the patterns of plausible reasoning,
when Waismanu considers number, when Freud sets up his
proof of the unconscious or the validity of the interpretation of
dreams, and finally it serves for Sir Thomas More to show the
right to disobedience. Another story which lies behind the argu-
ments relating to the interpretation of Wittgenstein's "family
resemblances,"5 7 and a closer account of the nature of legal argu-
ment and the judicial process, will reveal the truth of the apho-
rism that the law consists of ratiocination not rationalization 8
It may be objected that the formulation of the logical status
of a legal calculus of axioms and theorems obscures the possi-
bility that there are exceptions to rules. In mathematics, for
example, the rules admit of no exception. Take for example the
rule that no even number except two is prime. Now if there is an
exception to this rule in mathematics we would have to throw
away the rule. In law, the development and derivation of a rule
from the cases may not operate like this. If there is an exception
we would not have to throw away the rule. The old adage "the ex-
ception proves the rule" may operate.
The fact that there are exceptions to the rule does not really
trouble the lawyer. When the exceptions eat away the rule, then
lawyers reanalyze the status of the rule by looking again at the
55. WITTGENSTEI&, PHMOSOPHCAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-74 (1953).
56. See PoLYA, MATHEmIATICS AND PLAUsIBLE REASONiNG (1954).
57. WITTGENSTEIN, op. cit. 8upra note 49, at § 66-74. See also Bambrough,
Universals and Family Resemblances, in 61 PROCEEmiNS OF ARISTOTELIA
Soc'y 907 (1960-61).
58. Of. Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalsation 74 Ami 463 (1965).
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cases which support it. This leads to a suggestion that it is logi-
cally possible for a judge to make a mistake in the House of Lords
and propound "internal inconsistencies" as Lord Justice Buckley
purportedly did.59 My thesis, however, does involve us in the idea
that it is not logically possible for the House of Lords to be mis-
taken, just as it is not logically possible that two and two should
not make four. Lord Radcliffe and Lord Reid in Nask v. Tamplin
& Sons approached this position in the following remarks:
My Lords, the decision of this House in Usher's case has been often
alluded to and sometimes explained. More than once it has been rather
explained away than explained: for I think that it has come to be
regarded as a special case, the principle of which it is difficult to dis-
cover and almost impossible to extend.61
My Lords, it is very unsatisfactory to have to grope for a decision
in this way, but the need to do so -arises from the fact that this House
has debarred itself from ever reconsidering any of its own decisions. It
matters not how difficult it is to find the ratio decidendi of a previous
case, that ratio must be found. And it matters not how difficult it is to
reconcile that ratio when found with statutory provisions or general
principles: that ratio must -be applied to any later case which is not
reasonably distinguishable.62
Their position reminds us of Whistler's observation "two and
two the mathematician would continue to make four, in spite of
the whine of the amateur for three, or the cry of the critic for
five."6" Dr. Johnson argued in this way when someone was obtuse
about the gender of a Latin word. In answer to the claim that
there was a reason for the suggestion, Dr. Johnson said, 'ou may
have a reason for making two and two five, but that does not
make it so." Now many mathematicians in the past and some
logicians, like members of the House of Lords, have said different
things and have given reasons for their statements. But in mathe-
matics and logic the alleged reasons do not make two and two any-
thing but four. Judgments and opinions are like these reasons,
they are marks on paper, but they do not constitute the law. The
reasons are not legal entities. One of the constituents of law is
what lawyers call the ratio decidendi of a case or a line of cases.
Some talk of extracting the ratio decidendi from the case. The
ratio of a case, we can say without going into the much discussed
59. See The Aello, [1961] A.C. 135, 166 (1960).
60. [1952] A.C. 231 (1951).
61. Id. at 256 (opinion of Lord Radcliffe).
62. Id. at 250 (opinion of Lord Reid).
63. WHIsTLER, THE GENTLE ART OF MAKING ENsaIIs 26 (3d ed. 1904).
analysis of it, is rather like the hidden qualities which Bacon saw
in the simple forms. The view that judgments must be taken
literally is like mistaking the simple forms for the latent qualities,
or mistaking that which one would put in the table of presences
for the interpretation. The law is not like this. If we resort to
the analogy of models and analogies in sciences, there are rela-
tionships between features which are present but latent and which
are not revealed by the simple forms. In science these analogies
are said to be of service in seeking or confirming hypotheses. In
the law however these relationships or analogies are legal entities.
They have an analogy to mathematics and compare and contrast
with points, vectors, tensors, triangularity, number, and so on.
The ratio decidendi is a logical construction. This is why deci-
sions of the House of Lords cannot be wrong. There is a con-
sistency principle and the calculus operates ultimately with logical
construction. It is not that judges may not say silly things and
make elementary mistakes in what they say and how they say it. 4
If the judges cannot make mistakes, a sceptic may insist that
here is a difference between law and mathematics. The argument,
however, is that decisions of the House of Lords cannot be wrong,
not that judges may not be mistaken in what they say and some-
times speak irrationally. Mistakes in mathematics, like mistakes
in law, cannot alter the fact that the truths of mathematics and
law remain truths. This likeness, however, brings out a dissimi-
larity. Law and mathematics may be disparate. The truths of
mathematics are said to be necessary, the truths of law are non-
necessary. There are other dissimilarities. The doctrine of
64. My argument here is supported by Fitz-Gerald v. Pole, 4 Bro. P.C. 439,
448, 2 Eng. Rep. 297, 304 (H.L. 1754):
Lastly, that there have been judicial determinations, and one upon this
very policy, in favour of what the plaintiff in error contended for, un-
reversed and unappealed from; and people probably have transacted
losses upon their authority, and entered into contracts according to
the sense judicially received. That in mercantile contracts, especially for
the sake of certainty, it is better to adhere to decisions, even if they
were at first erroneous. That all new contracts were made in the sense of
the judicial determinations; and supposing an interpretation at first
wrong, it becomes afterwards unjust and highly inconvenient to vary
from it.
And in Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017
(K.B. 1774), Lord Mansfield said: "In all mercantile transactions the great
object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence that a
rule should be certain than whether the rule is established one way or the
other. Because speculators in trade then know what ground to go upon."
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precedents, the precedence of precedents, the hierachy of authori-
ties, the use of words in the law, cabin, crib, and confine the
law. The use of certain words in the law, the need to come to a
decision, and limiting the issue to be resolved by arbitrary plead-
ing of plaintiff and defendant, may limit the range of argument
and make the law both orthodox and hetrodox, idiosyncratic yet
paradigmatic. The connections and relations between mathematics
and logic on the one hand, and the law on the other are not isomor-
phic but analogous, not equivalent or identical but alike and
parallel.
The argument in support of this calculus thesis amounts to
showing that the resemblances between the law and mathematics
and logic are such that we will cease to think of the foundational
questions of law in the narrow ways of our forefathers who have
talked about them by resorting to constitutional history, etc., but
that we shall think again. We may then see that matters of logic
and possibility and concepts are involved in these studies. Also
if it can be shown that the law has such close analogies with
mathematics and logic, mathematicians and logicians may start
thinking again about the so-called omnipotence of formal sys-
tems and reconsider their own foundational studies as Wang,
Wittgenstein, and Waismann have done. They may reconsider the
metaphysical nature of their own disciplines. They may cease to
consider set theory as a solution to the riddles of the foundations
of logic and mathematics. They may cease to worry about the
necessary nature of mathematical and logical truths for legal truths
are not necessary. They are nonnecessary truths obtained by
reflection upon the cases. Perhaps mathematical and logical
truths are nonnecessary too. Thus, we may also reexamine what
are "proofs, bindings," etc. We are again in the realm of episte-
mology. This is why this is a philosophic article.
Finally, the question, "what are the truth values of the law"
remains to be discussed. The law proceeds from justice and not
towards it. By that I mean that in the days of old, Chaucerian
days when the sergeant of the law knew a hundred cases
"conned and learned by rote," judges, people of enormous emi-
nence like Bracton, Seagrave, Pateschali and Ralleigh, went on
Assize. They tried cases, primae impressionis, involving issues
never decided before. Suppose that Bracton had a case at
Gloucester to divide a baby in half, not like Solomon to obtain
evidence, but a partition action. Bracton would not have known
at first quite what to do. He would have heard all sorts of argu-
1022
ments and then decide the case; since "equality is equity, ' 5 he
may have decreed that the child be divided in two. If at Worcester
there was a case on all fours with the Gloucester case, what
should he have done? He should have directed the child be divided
in two. But this time not for the sake of justice, but because some
beastly registrar clerk had a book containing the report of the case
at Gloucester. The clerk, sitting in front of him, upon noticing
Bracton about to expatiate upon justice and read out the Nicho-
machean ethics, might well have turned around, rested upon one
knee, tapped his sleeve, and said "but you decided at Gloucester
on Faster term that the child must be divided in half." It shall
be taken for a precedent, the judge shall award it, the law allow
it. This is how the law proceeds and how the law is made, declared,
discovered. Now what does the law do with analogy, distinguish-
ing and reconciling, actual and hypothetical cases, building
theorems upon axioms and sometimes writing new axioms as Lord
Atkin did in the snail in the bottle case, Donoghue, v. Stephen-
son?6 It is building, constructing, discovering a logic perhaps in-
formal but rigid, a calculus of discernable moves, and a logic
whose truth functions are what Bacon once called de vero et falso
and not de bono et malo.67 Its modes are alethic and not deontic.
This again shows how much the law is like logic and how logic is
like the law. Remember here again Ramsey and Wittgenstein
regarded logic as a "normative science." '68 Now there are some who
suggest that the fundamental legal conceptions are concerned not
with the value true and false, but with right and wrong. All that
can be said in rebuttal is that the law is a calculus whose logic is
largely paraductive, concerned with reflective nonnecessary truths.
The ratiocination of the law is brought to bear upon matters of
law, which are for the judge and seem to be conceptual matters;
matters of Aleph fact which are pastiches and melanges of Alpha
fact and law, fitted and squared to answer a question such as "Is
this negligence?" "Is this murder?"; and Alpha facts which are
matters of fact or contingent matters to be decided by evidence
and observation such as, "Did Vacquier put poison in the salts
bottle?" "Did Reginald de L. lay Joan on the floor and put his
hands up her silken skirts?" To illustrate, if in the last example the
65. FRAcis, M.AXom OF EQurry maxim s, at 11 (1823).
66. [1932] A.C. 569, 578.
67. 2 BAcoN, THE WoRKS OF LoRD BACON 278 (1850).
68. See WrrTGENSTEMn, op. cit. supra note 49, at 38, citing a conversation
with Ramsey.
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jury decided that Reginald de L. had, in fact, acted as was alleged,
an Alpha fact, it is then for the jury upon the judge's direction as
to law to decide the Aleph fact "Did this constitute rape?" 'Is
Reginald de L. guilty of rape?" Yea or Nay.
Presenting the law as a calculus illustrates how the law is
binding, inexorable, compelling, ineluctible, irresistible, as are
mathematics and logic. A rule of law as was pointed out in Van
Grutten v. Foxwe169 is inflexible. The rule operates invariably,
and so to speak, automatically whenever the limitations are such
as to call for its application. It enables me to retort to those who
claim that the law is composed of commands or norms with the
riposte that Ramsey once told Wittgenstein that logic was a
"normative science." Thus we preserve the calculus. By bounding
the logic of law with truth and falsity we reestablish the resem-
blance between both mathematics and law; and logic and law.
Finally, a citation from authority. Lord Mansfield, in The Case
of John Sommersett, 7 said:
The state of 'slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of -being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive
law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and -time
itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is so
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive
law .... 71 We cannot in any of these points direct the law; the law
must rule use.. ..72 Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. 73
It has been my argument that the law has been given content. Its
vagueness has been filled out by showing that legal entities subsist
and like mathematical entities can be put into a coordinate
bounded by truth and falsity. This argument brings out the
difference between ethical relativists, objectivists, and sceptics.
The relativist says that we can compare the cases but not acquire
knowledge. The objectivist says that we can compare the cases
and acquire knowledge. Finally, the sceptic says we cannot com-
pare the cases. The relativist considers the cases as algebraic. That
is, as variables to which numbers cannot be assigned. The objec-
tivist considers the cases as arithmetical. He would claim that
facts, even where diverse and variable, can nevertheless be made
constant by assigning numbers to the variables. Thus the objec-
tivist can put all moral cases on a coordinate bounded at either
69. [1897] A.C. 658.
70. 20 State Tr. 1 (K.B. 1772).
71. Id. at 82.
72. Id. at 80.
73. Id. at 79.
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end by right and wrong. He can then assign a place along that
coordinate to the case under discussion, and thus claim objectivity
for ethical judgments and so claim that there is moral knowledge.
However, assigning a place in the coordinate is no more proof of
the existence or reality of ethics than putting imaginary numbers
along a Cartesian coordinate is proof that imaginary numbers of
geometrical form do exist or are real. The distinction between law
and ethics is brought out. The coordinates of law are bounded by
truth and falsity, whereas those of ethics are bounded by right
and wrong. The logic of the law is alethic - that of ethics is
deontic. The objectivity of ethics resolves into the question
whether right and wrong relates to reality in the same way as
truth and falsity relate to reality. This is an epistemological ques-
tion. Raising it in the context of calculus, legal, logical and mathe-
matical, distinguishes the law from ethics.
This is my case.

